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The country’s archipelagic configuration requires an efficient
maritime transport infrastructure composed of ports and shipping for
growth and socioeconomic integration. The integration of peripheral islands
to the urban economic nodes such as Metro Manila, Cebu, Davao, and
General Santos, and the diffusion of investments and economic activities
fundamentally count on an efficient road and maritime transport network.
This paper examines competition policy and the regulatory framework of
the port and shipping sectors. It assesses the policies and programs of the
government in promoting competition in these sectors and recommends
areas for policy and regulatory reform. After a brief description of the
analytical underpinnings of competition policy and regulation, the paper
reviews the present state of competition and regulation in Philippine ports
and inter-island shipping to identify emerging issues that call for policy




This paper examines the competition policy and regulatory framework of
the port and shipping sectors. It assesses the policies and programs of the
government in promoting competition in these sectors and recommends areas
for policy and regulatory reform. After a brief introduction, Section II describes
the analytical underpinnings of competition policy and regulation that provide
a framework for the succeeding discussion in Section III of the present state
of competition and regulation in Philippine ports. Meanwhile, Section IV
discusses inter-island shipping. Section V gives the concluding remarks and
provides specific recommendations for policy and regulatory reform.
The Philippines is an archipelago of 7,107 islands.  It has a long coastline
that extends to 235,973 sq. km, longer than that of the United States
(UNESCAP 2002b). The country’s archipelagic configuration requires an
efficient maritime transport infrastructure composed of ports and shipping
for growth and socioeconomic integration. The integration of peripheral islands
to the urban economic nodes such as Metro Manila, Cebu, Davao, and
General Santos, and the diffusion of investments and economic activities
fundamentally count on an efficient road and maritime transport network.
Maritime transport is the major means by which the islands are
connected, and the movement of commodities and people is facilitated. The
Philippines is likewise primarily linked to the international trade system
via maritime transport. By the 1990s, many countries had adopted a
development strategy that emphasizes integration with the global economy
(Clark et al. 2004). Because the Philippines seeks to integrate itself into the
global trading system, an efficient maritime transport, composed of ports
and shipping, is a necessary condition for successful integration.
However, the country’s inefficient maritime transport has effectively
acted as a barrier to domestic and international trade integration. It has
stymied countryside development because of the high cost of transporting
people and goods and has stunted efforts to improve productivity and the
competitiveness of exports and tourism. Inefficiencies in maritime transport
intensify transaction cost, resulting in higher goods prices and the erosionCompetition Policy and Regulation in Ports and Shipping
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of the competitiveness of exports. Research shows that as much as 40 percent
of predicted transport costs for coastal countries like the Philippines may be
explained by the quality of onshore infrastructure accounts (Limao and
Venables 2001). The inefficiencies stem from (a) inadequate port and vessel
capacities; (b) ineffective ports management and administration; and (c)
constraints arising from anticompetitive policies and regulation. Port
efficiency, a major determinant of shipping costs, is affected by government
regulation in a nonlinear way, that is, increasing at some level of intervention
and decreasing in excess of regulation (Clark et al. 2004). The lack of
competition in the shipping industry undermines incentives to minimize
costs that could simply be passed on to the consumers of the service.
Because the Philippines aspires to become a major maritime hub in
the Asia-Pacific region, that is, as an alternative to Singapore and Hong
Kong, modernization and restructuring in the shipping and ports industries
need to be seriously considered. There is an urgent need to address the
inadequacy in ports and vessels capacities, and to have efficient ports
management and administration. Competition policy and market-enhancing
regulation would motivate private sector investments in better-equipped
vessels and ports that support value-added logistics services. Modernization
efforts need to be supported by a competition policy and changes in the
regulatory framework to ensure efficiency and the protection of consumers
from the exercise of market power.3
Ports have traditionally been provided by the government while ports services
and inter-island shipping and cargo handling have been usually provided by
a highly regulated and sometimes protected private market. This has given
way to the present Philippine policy stance of building up more competitive
markets in infrastructure including maritime transport, mainly through
an overall shift in paradigm from government provision of infrastructure to
greater private sector participation with government providing a competitive
environment.
Competition policy and efficient regulation have a central role in certain
infrastructure and transport networks because of significant economies of
scale that these entail. Because of economies of scale, total costs will be
lower if service will be delivered by a single firm rather than by a large
number of firms. In addition, large infrastructure and transport networks
are capital intensive and involve long-lived assets. Duplication of operations
may raise the overall costs significantly. The number of service providers
rests on the capacity of the industry to support them, for instance, where an
area or a route could support only one surviving firm. These conditions call
for regulatory intervention to avoid possible exploitative firm behavior. In
the extreme case, public ownership of the infrastructure or public provision
of the service has been employed by governments to address such market
failure. Alternatively, the state allows private monopoly to operate but under
regulation of the government to prevent the exercise of market power.
Because of severe fiscal constraints, the Philippine government has
failed to satisfy the growing demand for better and lower-priced infrastructure
services and greater access by the population. In particular, the development
of ports in the Philippines has lagged behind other ASEAN countries because
the government has not been able to finance the needed infrastructure. Thus,
the government has turned to greater private sector participation not only
in the provision of funds for infrastructure, but also for expertise in ports
administration and management.  The very limited financial capacity of the
state has spurred the privatization of infrastructure provision.
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The government regulates inter-island shipping and cargo handling
services that have been traditional private sector areas of operation. However,
efficient regulation generally is often difficult to install and is susceptible to
capture. Newbery (1999) argues that regulation is inevitably inefficient and
thus, the concern about the damage brought about by overregulation.
Regulation is not an easy task. Oftentimes, problems of information
asymmetry between the regulator and the firm arise. The regulator is often
disadvantaged because it cannot entirely know the financial structure and
actual conduct of the firm. On the other hand, regulation done in pursuit of
social objectives could sometimes overrestrict private enterprise and endanger
the financial viability of the business.
Regulation may enhance port efficiency while excess regulation may
negate gains. Clark et al. (2004) found a nonlinear relationship between
regulation and port efficiency (Figure 1). Not only does port development
require efficient infrastructure, it also calls for efficiency in industry design
and regulatory structures.
Competition, on the other hand, confers benefits to the ports and
shipping sector. It encourages the entry of other firms and opens the industry
to better and lower-priced service. Under a competitive environment, rival
firms try to outdo each other by offering lower-priced and better-quality
service in a bid to capture a greater market share, which, in effect, also
introduces discipline in the market. Consequently, this situation would call
Figure 1.Port efficiency and level of regulation of mandatory
port services, 1998
Source: Clark et al. (2004)5
for less intrusive regulation of the industry because competition provides
incentives to firms to reduce costs and to innovate for increased profits. It
tends to limit collusive behavior in the industry and makes possible the
transfer of rents to consumers.
However, it is naïve to expect pure competition and zero regulation in
the area of infrastructure and transport networks due to the economies of
scale needed to operate in the industry. It is also difficult to find unfettered
competition because market competition needs to occur within a framework
of rules, rights, and obligations (Banks 2002). Privatization could simply
result in a transfer of power to private monopolies from bureaucratic monopoly
(Tornell 1999). Industry liberalization, which is expected to introduce more
competition in an industry, does not necessarily bring about the intended
effect. Thus, there is a need for an explicit competition policy and efficient
regulation that balance investor interest and consumer welfare.
The real challenge is how to have a degree of regulatory restraint on
private providers that would not unnecessarily stifle investments and
innovations. The policy challenge is to find the right combination of regulation
and openness to potential competition in an industry such as infrastructure
that needs lumpy investments in long-lived assets. While in principle,
competition is preferred to regulation, it may be necessary to unbundle
industries into competitive and noncompetitive components. The policy may
be to leave the competitive sector to market forces and contain regulation to
component or components where competition is not feasible. For instance,
ownership of ports could be monopolistic but other port services such as
cargo handling could be competitively provided by more than one operator.
Where the scope for competition is substantial, there may be little need for
regulation as, for example, in the provision of shipping services.
Nevertheless, vertical integration of competitive and noncompetitive
components complicates the regulatory framework. Undue regulatory
intervention in the potentially competitive sector gives rise to inefficiencies
and lower level of welfare. Thus, a careful diagnosis of the industry structure
is imperative before any regulation is laid out and implemented.
The scope and form of regulation depend on the kind of competition
that is created in a particular sector. The form of competition that is created
in a particular sector, in turn, depends on the scale of operation and level of
development in the sector. For instance, a route that is initially not being
served by any shipping line could be opened to the market by inviting bids
from firms to operate for a specific period of time. This creates competition
for market. After the contract for the operation in the route had been awarded,
some regulation that makes the market contestable is needed in order to
Competition and Regulation: Some RemarksCompetition Policy and Regulation in Ports and Shipping
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regulate the monopoly behavior of the winning firm or (few) firms.
Alternatively, when demand for shipping services increases to a certain
high level and the agreed upon period of exclusive operation has been
completed, the route could now allow more than one operator. The entry of
other operators would facilitate competitive behavior in the market and hence,
regulation would need to take a different form.7
In summary, competition policy and regulation are not mutually exclusive
or contradictory. They can actually be mutually re-enforcing. The next section
presents the current status and issues of competition and regulation in the
ports and shipping sectors.
Significance of Port Efficiency
Ports, being nodes that connect land and maritime transport, are a vital
component of the maritime industry. Port efficiency reduces logistical costs
and results in greater passenger convenience and thus, is an important
determinant of maritime transport costs. On the other hand, inefficient port
infrastructure explains around 40 percent of predicted maritime transport
costs for coastal countries while cargo handling accounts for 46 percent of
sea transport costs in the Philippines (Limao and Venables 2001; Clark et
al. 2004). Table 1 compares the efficiency of Philippine ports handling foreign
trade with those of the leading Asian ports.








Table 1. Indicators of port efficiency
Notes: Port efficiency index is from the Global Competitiveness
Report, 7 being the best score; median clearance time is the median
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Physical infrastructure, industry structure, and regulation affect port
performance. The structure of the industry and regulatory restrictions, e.g.,
cargo handling tariff and certain procedures, could induce inefficiencies and
anticompetitive behavior of firms involved in the port industry.
Direction of Reforms in the Port Industry
The maritime transport industry has been undergoing rapid changes,
especially in the past decade. Ports, like most forms of infrastructures, have
been traditionally provided by the state. The government identifies the area,
builds the infrastructure, maintains superstructures including buildings
within the ports, operates cargo handling, and provides other port services.
However, in a number of countries, the structure of the port industry has
changed because of the unsatisfactory performance of publicly owned and
managed ports. Inefficient bureaucratic planning and management brought
both huge financial losses to the state and burden to business and consumers.
Tight fiscal constraints and the need for greater competitiveness of businesses
induced governments to turn to privatization to meet the mounting demand
for better port services. Governments have not been able or were not willing
to invest on expensive port development projects or equipment. Thus, starting
in the 1980s, some countries began to reconsider the organization and
management of national port systems. These countries started seeking ways
to increase private sector participation in the provision of port infrastructure
and services. In Southeast Asia, Malaysia was the first country to involve
the private sector to manage port facilities by leasing the container terminal
in Port Kelang to a private consortium in 1986. From then on, private sector
participation expanded and by 1995, port productivity was reported to have
increased by 15 to 20 percent (Peters 1995).
There are varying degrees of private sector participation according to
the structure of ports system. The following are the main models of mixture
of public and private sectors involvement (World Bank 2007):
Services port: Services ports are mainly public in character. The
port authority is responsible for the port as a whole. It owns,
maintains, and operates the infrastructure and superstructures,
and cargo handling services are executed by labor hired by the port
authority itself. Many ports in developing countries are still
structured according to this model.
Tool port: Port infrastructure and superstructure are owned and
managed by the port authority. Private cargo handling companies
use these facilities through concessions or licenses.9
Landlord port: In this model, port infrastructure is owned by the
port authority but is leased to private operating companies and/or
industries. The private port operators provide and maintain their
own superstructure, including buildings, cranes, vans, and forklifts.
The port authority acts largely as a regulator and as a landlord,
while port operations are carried out by the private sector. This
model is increasingly becoming popular in large and medium-sized
ports worldwide.
Fully privatized port: In this model, the state basically has no
meaningful participation. Ownership of port land is transferred to
the private sector. Regulatory functions are also passed on to the
private successor. Therefore, privatized ports are essentially self-
regulating.
Except in the case of fully privatized ports, some basic responsibilities
remain with the public sector regardless of the degree of private sector
participation. These include the provision of port land and infrastructure,
port planning and coordination, regulation of safety within the port area,
and environmental protection. Some advocates of competition argue that
the involvement of the government should be limited to these functions. The
amount of regulation that will be required largely depends on the structure
of the ports system. The government has some latitude in managing the
degree of competition except in the case of fully privatized ports. However, in
the latter case, the government can regulate tariff setting of port and cargo
handling operators.
The Philippine Port System
The Philippine Port Authority (PPA) dominates the Philippine port system
as the main developer, operator, and regulator of ports in the country (Figure
2). The Philippine port system has four categories: (a) the PPA ports system
consisting of public and private ports; (b) ports under the jurisdiction of
independent port authorities (IPA); (c) municipal ports devolved to the local
government units (LGUs); and (d) the recently established Road RORO
terminal system (RRTS).
The PPA port system
The PPA, established in 1974, is the main government agency concerned
with the planning and development of seaports in the country. It was also
originally mandated to plan and coordinate port development in the entire
Philippines.
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The PPA port system is the most important and extensive network of
ports in the country.1 It consists of 115 PPA-owned ports and over 500 private
(commercial and noncommercial/industrial) ports under the direct
supervision of the PPA. The PPA-owned ports were developed and are being
maintained by the PPA. The biggest common-user ports in the Philippines
are all in Manila, namely the Manila International Contrainer Terminal
(MICT) and the South and North Harbors. Although these are under the
supervision of the PPA, they are under long-term concessions (except for
North Harbor) with the private sector. In almost all cases, cargo handling
services are provided by private cargo handling companies.2
Private ports are mostly for industrial use; there are, however, those
which operate for commercial purposes. The most important private
commercial port is the Harbour Centre Port Terminal (HCPTI) in Manila
that operates both as a domestic and a foreign port. HCPTI competes with
PPA-owned ports: South Harbor, which is privately operated under a long-
term concession, and North Harbor, the largest domestic cargo in the
Philippines, which is also undergoing privatization.
The PPA has no investment in the private ports but receives a share of
port dues (i.e., 50% share from usage/berthing fees and wharfage dues).
There are around 30 private commercial ports, e.g., Allen Port in Samar,
San Lorenzo Port in Guimaras, Tefasco port in Davao, and Bredco in Bacolod.3
The latest addition to this family is HCPT in Manila established in 1996.
Private commercial ports rarely provide competition to PPA ports with the
Figure 2.The Philippine port system
1 Established in 1974, PPA is a government corporation mainly concerned with the planning and
development of seaports in the country. Most ports especially the large ones are under the
control of PPA.
2 These cargo handling companies formed themselves into the Philippine Chamber of Arrastre
and Stevedoring Operators (PCASO).
3 The organization of private port operators is called the Association of Private Port Owners
and Operators of the Philippines (APPOOP).11
possible exception of HCPT that operates in the same area in Manila where
the PPA ports operate.
The PPA is financially autonomous from the government.4 It earns
revenues from (a) concession fees from the lease of South Harbor and MICT;
(b) port charges such as wharfage, berthing, pilotage, etc.; and (c) a share of
cargo handling revenues from private cargo handling operators and from
port charges of privately operated ports. A 1992 law mandates it to remit 50
percent of its net income as dividends to the national government. Its ports
handle domestic and foreign cargo (containerized and bulk) and passengers.
Some PPA-owned ports allow for RORO operations.
Independent port authorities
There are six independent port authorities (IPAs) outside the purview of the
PPA, namely:
y Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), which operates and
manages the Subic Bay Freeport in Zambales;
y Cebu Port Authority (CPA), which is in-charge of all ports in the
province of Cebu;
y Cagayan Economic Zone Authority (CEZA), which oversees the
operation of the Port Irene;
y Phividec Industrial Authority (PIA), which is in-charge of the newly
constructed Mindanao Container Port Terminal (MCPT) located
within the Phividec Industrial Estate in Cagayan de Oro;
y Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARRM), which manages
the devolved PPA ports in Polloc, Jolo, and Bongao; and
y Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA), which
supervises the port in San Fernando, La Union, and manages the
former US facility in Clark Field, Pampanga.
With the exception of the Subic Bay Freeport and the Mindanao
Container Port Terminal, all other ports were spun-off from the PPA port
system. As IPAs, the port authorities can set their own rates but normally
take a cue from the PPA. The IPAs were created to decentralize control of
the PPA, to create more competition with its ports, and to allow an LGU to
have greater control of its ports.
State of Competition and Regulation of Ports
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Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)-developed
feeder ports
The DOTC also develops and funds the construction of small landing stages
and feeder ports, which eventually are handed over to the LGUs. At present,
there are about 427 fishing ports, landing stages, and municipal feeder ports
in the country. Ports under the jurisdiction of LGUs include ports that were
built by the national government but later on transferred to municipal
governments and those which were built by the LGUs themselves. Fishing
ports are basically used for fishing but nevertheless handle some commercial
cargo transfer under the agreement of the PPA and the Philippine Fisheries
and Development Authority (PFDA).
Road-RORO terminal system (RRTS)
The most recent addition to the Philippine port system is the Road-RORO
terminal system (RRTS) established in 2003 to be an integral part of the
national highway network and aims to parallel the PPA port system.5  It is
meant to provide greater access to island provinces and better integration
among the different regions. It is a response to the clamor for greater efficiency
and lower cost in transporting passengers and goods from Mindanao to Luzon.
Executive Order (EO) 170 calls for private sector and LGU collaboration in
the establishment of RORO links as part of the national highway network
(Basilio 2003).
Aside from new RORO ports, EO 170 also mandates the privatization
and/or devolution of existing public RORO ports under the PPA or CPA.6
Existing private port operators are encouraged to convert their operations to
RRTS. To bank roll its development, the state-owned Development Bank of
the Philippines (DBP) has opened a lending window called Sustainable
5 The following distinguishes the RRTS from the regular (LOLO) ports:
– No cargo handling charges since the cargo is “rolling”;
– No wharfage dues (specified under EO No.170);
– Toll fee consists of four unbundled cost items: (i) a terminal fee charged on the self-powered
vehicle and passengers for the use of the terminal; (ii) berthing fee levied on the RORO vessel
by the terminal operator for mooring and berthing; (iii) freight or rolling cargo fee, based on the
lane meter or the actual space occupied by the vehicle, charged to the rolling cargo by the
carrier vessel operator; and (iv) a passage fee levied to the passengers by the RORO vessel
operator;
– Simplified documentary requirements; and
– Waiver of port authorities’ share in revenues, with PPA and MARINA receiving a fixed annual
administrative supervision fee.
6 Unfortunately, almost two years after the EO 170 was issued, the PPA has yet to finalize the
guidelines for the development of private ports under the RRTS.13
Logistics Development Program (SLDP) in support of this thrust. Eligible
projects for funding are RORO vessel acquisition, RORO port construction,
investment in bulk handling of agricultural commodities, and cold chain
facilities. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed recently by
interested LGU and private investors seeking to establish a RORO network
that would connect the Visayan islands and Mindanao, as follows:
y Cebu (Cordova) – Getafe (Bohol)
y Guadalupe (Southern Leyte) – Ubay (Bohol)
y Loay (Bohol) – Mambajao (Camiguin)
y Camiguin – Misamis Oriental
y Jasaan (Misamis Oriental) – Loay (Bohol)
Recent developments
Competition, privatization, transparency, and greater private sector
participation are the stated policy objectives of the government. The
government has implemented these objectives in the development and
operation of public ports with mixed results.
The privatization of MICT and South Harbor
The first major procompetition initiative by the government in the port
system was the privatization of the terminal operation of the MICT in 1987.
A 25-year contract was awarded to the International Container Terminal
Services, Inc. (ICTSI), a private terminal operator. This is the first successful
case of the implementation of a “landlord” port model in the country. This
model was replicated almost a decade later with the awarding of the terminal
operation of the South Harbor to a private company, the Asian Terminals,
Inc. (ATI).
The development of a private commercial port in Manila
The second initiative started in 1992 with the government’s Memorandum
Order No. 415 directing the National Housing Authority (NHA) to implement
the Smokey Mountain Development Plan (SMDP) and undertake the
reclamation of the area across Road 10. The PPA was directed to assist in
the evaluation of the port-related land issues in the reclaimed area. In 1993,
Memorandum Circular No. 45 directed all concerned government agencies
to liberalize and provide an environment conducive for increased competition
in the support service sector, particularly land, air and sea transportation,
communication, energy, insurance, and port services.
In 1996, the PPA issued a permit to R-II Builders, as part of the SMDP,
to construct a 15-hectare private port facility in the reclaimed area. The
State of Competition and Regulation of PortsCompetition Policy and Regulation in Ports and Shipping
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port facility, named Harbour Centre Port Terminal (HCPT), was envisaged
to be operated as a private commercial port and to directly compete with the
ports in Manila.
The demonopolization and privatization program
The government issued EO 212 “accelerating the de-monopolization and
privatization program for government ports in the country.” However, the
labor unions succeeded in opposing its implementation, citing as reason the
possible displacement of port workers in the process and arguing that port
privatization would result in the inability of some cargo handling companies
to shoulder the retirement benefits of the displaced port workers. In 1997,
on Labor Day, the government issued EO 4107 rescinding EO 212.
Policy reversal
In 1998, the government issued EO 59 directing PPA “to adopt and implement
a program for further rationalization, modernization, and improvement of
port services and facilities in government ports.” The existing Charter of the
PPA (PD 857) mandates it to develop seaport terminals, other facilities, and
ancillary services in the port areas. However, the EO argued that the
government does not have sufficient funds to finance the modernization of
those publicly owned ports. To address this constraint, EO 59 was issued for
the purpose of promoting and encouraging the “participation of the private
sector by requiring all existing facility operators and service providers such
as cargo handling operators, shipping companies, and port workers and
labor to unify into one corporation by merger, consolidation, buyout, joint
venture, or by any other similar means to manage, operate, and develop the
entire government port without need of a public bidding.”  While the objectives
of port modernization and greater private sector participation are laudable,
what was highly questionable in EO 59 is the manner by which port
privatization and modernization will be carried out, to wit (Basilio 1999):
a. Creation of a nationwide private monopoly. The contract was
supposed to be awarded to a “consortium” organized two months
before the issuance of EO 59. The consortium is to be composed of
terminal operators, cargo handling companies, and big shipping
lines.
7 EO 410 (Repealing EO 212 s. 1994 in Recognition of the Power of the PPA under P.D. No. 857
to Implement the Policy of Accelerating the De-monopolization and Privatization of Government
Ports in the Country).15
b. Bundling of port services. This means that all port services,
including ancillary services, will have to be provided by the private
port monopolist.
c. Negotiated contract. The operation and development of the ports
will be awarded to the port monopolist without the benefit of a
public bidding, contrary to the principle of transparency and
competition being promoted by the government.
d. Nationwide coverage. This is not only a monopoly of one port but of
the entire port system.
However, the business community and the public vigorously objected
to the implementation of EO 59. Because of mounting public pressure,
government revoked EO 59 on October 30, 2000.8 The government issued
EO 308 on October 31, formally rescinding EO 59 and directing the PPA to
subject the privatization of the Manila North Harbor to competition by
dividing it into two terminals and subjecting it to public bidding.
Seeking greater private sector participation
The government’s Memorandum Order No. 47 (s. 2001) directed the PPA to
assist in the technical evaluation of port-related land use in the reclaimed
areas and expeditiously process applications for the permits for private
commercial ports. Thus, the PPA issued HCPT a permanent commercial
permit to operate and handle (a) all types of domestic vessels and cargoes
and (b) foreign vessels and cargoes chartered by the locators at Harbour
Centre. In 2003, the PPA expanded HCPT’s permit to handle foreign break-
bulk traffic not limited to its locators.
The government also issued EO 170 and 170-A s. 2003 promoting Private
Sector Investment in the Road RORO Ferry Terminal System (RRTS). This
system, once fully operational, will be a parallel and competitor port system
to the PPA utilizing the RORO technology. The EOs call for private sector
and LGU collaboration in the establishment of RORO links as part of the
national highway network. Under this policy, the PPA and CPA (Cebu Port
Authority) are mandated to privatize their RORO ports to the private sector
or devolve the same to the LGUs.
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Emerging Issues
Several issues arise from the policy, regulatory, and institutional framework
of the ports sector that have constrained competition and provided
burdensome regulation (Table 2). That framework has affected the existing
structure and performance of Philippine ports. (Overall, port efficiency in
the Philippines lags behind its rival Asian ports as indicated in Table 1).
Conflicting roles of the PPA
The Philippine port system gravitates around the PPA port system and
government-owned IPAs. In this system, the PPA has multiple roles as a
developer, operator, maintainer, and regulator. It regulates private ports,
awards contracts for cargo handling services to the private sector in ports
owned by it, and regulates the entry of the private sector through the issuance
of permits to construct and operate ports. This highly centralized port
ownership and administration system leads to conflict of functions and interest
problems.
Limited competition
This setup disadvantages non-PPA ports and leads to limited competition in
the industry. The PPA, which is also a port owner, issues permits to private
companies to construct and operate ports. This setup creates the wrong
incentive for the PPA, which may not approve the privates sector’s application
for construction or expansion if this threatens its port ownership and
revenues.  In 1997, the PPA issued a regulation liberalizing the construction
and operation of private industrial ports but not its operation for commercial
purposes.
Prior to the entry of Harbour Centre Port Terminal in 1996, the PPA
was the only operator of the ports (MICT, South and North Harbors) in
Manila. Initially, the North Harbor handled domestic cargoes while MICT
and South Harbor handled foreign cargoes. In 2003, Pier 15 of South Harbor
was converted into a domestic port (Eva Macapagal Terminal).
The PPA owns these ports but the terminal operations of MICT and
South Harbor have been awarded to ICTSI and ATI, respectively, as part of
the government’s privatization program. In the case of the North Harbor,
cargo handling companies operate in specific piers. Table 3 and Table 4
provide a comparison of the capacities and performance (in terms of an
indicator of productivity and market share) of PPA-owned ports operated by
private concessionaires and a private port owned and operated by a private
investor (Harbour Centre).17
Table 2. Institutional and regulatory framework for PPA ports
Port System
PPA Port System
LOLO and RORO operations;
containerized and
noncontainerized cargoes
Port Authority and Legal
Framework
The PPA serves as the main au-
thority in the national port sys-
tem, per Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 505 (1974), as amended by
PD 857. PPA is a government
owned and controlled corporation
(GOCC); an attached agency to
DOTC.  As a GOCC, the PPA
(a) raises its revenues, (b) does
not receive funding from the na-
tional government, and (c) de-




y PPA develops, owns, main-
tains, and regulates its ports;
y Sets and collects port charges
such as wharfage dues,
berthing/ usage fees, and ter-
minal handling costs;
y Approves increases in cargo
handling rates and receives
10% and 20% from cargo
handling revenues on
domestic and foreign cargo,
respectively;
y Awards contracts to private
terminal operators (e.g., 25-
year management contract
with ICTSI for the operation
of MICT, 10-year contract
with ATI for South Harbor),
and cargo handling operators
(2-year probationary contract/
10-year contract without pub-
lic bidding.)  Under such con-
cessions, port charges and
cargo handling rates are set
by the PPA.
Private ports
y PPA also regulates private
ports. The regulation comes
in the form of (a) issuance of
permit to construct and
operate the port, and (b)
approval of increases in cargo
handling rates and port
charges such as berthing/
usage fees and wharfage
dues. It also collects shares
from port charges (50%).
Source: World Bank (2004) Interviews.
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In 1995, the PPA Board approved the proposal of R-II Builders Inc. to
develop and operate a private commercial port at the Manila North Harbor.9
A year later, the PPA gave R-II a permit to construct a 15-hectare port
facility (HCPT). However, it was only in June 2002 that the PPA issued
HCPT a commercial permit to: (a) operate and handle all types of domestic
vessels and cargoes, and (b) limit to its locators the operations of foreign
vessels and cargoes, provided such vessels are chartered to carry only cargoes
of such authorized locators.
Limited competition started when HCPT was issued a permit by PPA
in 2003 to handle foreign break-bulk cargoes. As a result, HCPTI claims
that 80 percent of the foreign break-bulk traffic (normally handled at the
South Harbor) transferred to Harbour Centre due to better service and lower
cost (rate at HCPTI is 50% lower than PPA rates). The need for barges
State of Competition and Regulation of Ports

































y Foreign cargoes – mainly
containerized
y Foreign cargoes – both
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*Former cargo handling operator
9 PPA Board Resolution No. 1473.Competition Policy and Regulation in Ports and Shipping
20
disappeared because docked foreign vessels can unload at the Harbour Centre
(the draft is deep enough to accommodate foreign vessels). In the case of
South Harbor, barges are needed because foreign vessels cannot dock at the
port. Of the 50 barges that were utilized prior to the operation of HCPTI,
only five are still being used at the South Harbor at present. Table 5
summarizes the status of competition among Manila ports.
North Harbor, South Harbor, and HCPT compete for domestic cargoes,
whether break-bulk or containerized.  South Harbor and HCPT compete for
foreign break-bulk cargoes. ICTSI has the permit but is not actively competing
in this market. Instead, it concentrates on the foreign containerized cargo
market. Only MICT and South Harbor compete for foreign containerized
cargoes despite the capacity of HCPT to compete in this market. The PPA
has not issued HCPT the permit to handle foreign containerized cargoes to
date in spite of HCPT’s satisfaction of the PPA’s requirements for the issuance
of the permit. Table 6 illustrates the positive benefits of competition in the
port sector.
Several factors create a disincentive for more competition in the port
sector, namely:
• The PPA’s bias against full competition in the foreign containerized
market, which might undermine the income potential of MICT
and South Harbor. HCPT’s handling of foreign break-bulk cargoes
led to an erosion of the income potential of South Harbor. A lower
income generated from MICT and South Harbor operations means
lower rents paid to the PPA that receives both fixed and variable
fees from port operations (Table 7). The PPA gets a 10 percent and
20 percent share from domestic and foreign cargo handling
revenues, respectively. Table 7 shows the PPA-approved cargo
handling rate increases in recent years.
• A reduction of the PPA’s income will affect its capacity to declare
more dividends to the national government.
• Lower income will also affect the PPA’s port development and
maintenance activities.
• Lower volumes handled by PPA terminal operators (ICTSI and
ATI) have implications on their income, profitability, and investment
commitments (e.g., ATI is committed to invest $300 million within
the contract period).
In sum, the PPA may have a weak incentive to promote competition to
protect its own interest. This highlights the “conflict of interest” situation
that the PPA faces because it is vested with proprietary, developmental, and
regulatory functions.21
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the market is expected
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With a few exceptions and despite policy pronouncements that favor
multiple operators, the PPA has chosen to limit a port to one cargo handling
company (except in North Harbor). Bidding is a stated PPA policy but the
award or renewal of cargo handling contracts is mainly by negotiations.10
Thus, the PPA can simply renew a contract without the benefit of public
10 PPA AO 01-2001 (Renewal of Expired and Expiring Cargo Handling Contracts) seeks to grant
the renewal of expired and expiring cargo handling contracts without public bidding, contrary
to what the law dictates. EO 40 s. 2001 and EO 109 s. 2002 issued by President Arroyo
mandate government agencies to subject to public bidding all procurement, including cargo
handling, and contract award. The PPA requested the Office of Government Corporate Counsel
(OGCC) for an opinion on the matter. OGCC in its opinion (No. 234) affirmed that indeed cargo
handling is covered by EOs 40 and 109.  Instead of implementing the advice, however, the PPA
requested the OGCC to reconsider its opinion. OGCC did reconsider its opinion (No. 282). Early
this year, Congress passed into law RA 9184 (Government Procurement Reform Act) that
defines as a matter of policy, in all cases, the following principles: transparency and competition
through public bidding, monitoring, accountability, etc.  When the issue was brought up by the
private sector at the NPAC for the purpose of making sure that PPA policies are consistent with
the law, the PPA said it will seek another legal opinion from the OGCC.
Table 8. PPA revenues and net income, 2001–2002
(in million pesos)
Port revenues
Fixed fee from ICTSI












a January to September.
b ATI only.
Sources of basic data: PPA financial reports, news article written
by Teresa Visita of Malaya.































* Rate increase applicable only to MICT and South Harbor.23
bidding or without a thorough assessment of performance. This grants
tremendous rents to the fortunate company.
The centralization of port administration leaves very little room, if at
all, to interport competition. It has been claimed that the PPA regulates
against competition by not granting Harbour Centre (a private commercial
port) a permit that will allow the handling of foreign containerized cargoes
because it will compete against PPA-owned ports (i.e., MICT and South
Harbor).
The PPA’s Charter allows it a share of at least 10 percent from cargo
handling revenues. It regulates and approves tariffs and rate increases in
port charges and cargo handling rates for both public and private ports.
This puts it in a potential conflict of interest situation because higher cargo
handling rates given to private port operators result in a higher share of the
revenues for the PPA that regulates rate setting. This is a case of a regulator
benefiting from its own regulation.11 Non-PPA ports, including private ports,
have to give 10 percent of cargo handling revenues to the PPA that uses it
mainly for the development of its own ports. It seems that the ‘tax’ paid by
the private ports leads to their own disfavor because of the competition
presented by PPA ports supported by that ‘tax’.
On the other hand, it is claimed that present port charges, including
tariffs for domestic ship berthing and cargo handling, are set extremely
lower than what is required for financial viability of operations (JICA 2003).
Philippine port charges are among the lowest in the Asian region (UNESCAP
2002a). Since a port that handles only domestic cargo has limited sources of
revenue, a number of ports are not financially independent, especially those
operated by LGUs.
Undue restrictions on setting cost-based tariffs may jeopardize port
operations and may reduce the attractiveness of port development to private
investors. This prevents potential entry of more cost efficient operators who
could offer lower port charges. Thus, there is a case for more transparent
procedures on how cargo handling tariffs are set for different ports.
11 In the past, the PPA had as much as 33 percent share from cargo handling revenue. Thus,
approval of petitions for rate increase invariably benefits the regulator itself. In August 2002,
President Arroyo directed the PPA to adopt a universal rate for collecting the government share
from the revenues of cargo handlers, that is, 10 percent for domestic ports and 20 percent for
international ports. The PPA announced that it has revised its rules on the bidding of cargo
handling contracts to comply with the presidential directive. Instead of using “the highest share
to the PPA” rule as basis for winning a contract, the PPA will now use “the lowest service rate”
as basis since its share from cargo handling revenues is already fixed. However, the PPA has
to withdraw AO-O1-2001 that allows the renewal of expired and expiring cargo handling
contracts without public bidding.
State of Competition and Regulation of PortsCompetition Policy and Regulation in Ports and Shipping
24
Another conflict of interest is a potential bias for multiple cargo handling
instead of RORO shipping12 because the latter does not entail cargo handling.13
Lesser cargo handling implies a lesser revenue share for the PPA from
cargo handling fees. In 2001, the share from cargo handling fees accounted
for 18 percent of the total revenues generated by the PPA from port
operations.14 In addition, the huge revenues from multiple cargo handling
may motivate the (traditional) large shipping companies to ignore RORO
shipping that can bring shippers positive benefits such as reduction in
breakage and deterioration of cargoes, increased security of cargoes, and
reduction in pilferage.
 What about IPA ports? It is doubtful whether these IPAs are providing
interport competition to PPA ports. For instance, MICT and Subic Bay
Freeport are operated by the same terminal operator. On the other hand,
the terminal operator at the South Harbor is also the cargo handling operator
at the Port of Batangas. The newly constructed MCPT in Misamis Oriental
is supposed to provide competition to PPA’s port in Cagayan de Oro. However,
even before it could operate, a lower court issued an injunction to operate on
the basis of a case filed by the cargo handling operator at the PPA Cagayan
de Oro port, arguing that the MCPT provides unfair competition.
In conclusion, despite the objective of creating more competition, there
is actually very limited competition, if not at all, in the Philippine ports
system under the current policy, institutional, and regulatory framework.
12 In the early 1990s, various studies (JICA, SHIPDECO) recommended the extensive use of the
RORO shipping as the most appropriate mode of sea transport for an archipelagic country like
the Philippines.
13 PPA implemented RORO in some ports. Special ports, or terminals in existing ports designed
for intermodal transport, were constructed more than 20 years ago. The earlier versions were
the water links in the Pan-Philippine Highways (implemented by DPWH)—from Sorsogon to
Samar, thence to Leyte and Surigao (in Mindanao). These were subsequently called the
Eastern Seaboard. PPA also introduced ferry ports and services on the Batangas-Mindoro sea
corridor, thence to Panay, Guimaras, and Negros; these were subsequently labelled the Eastern
seaboard. The Manila-Cebu Corridor Intermodal Transport Plan (MCCITP) envisaged in 1994 the
RORO ports in Pagbilao, Quezon and Balamban, Cebu. The Central Visayas East-West Intermodal
Transport Project came up with the east-west land-sea links from Ormoc to Cebu, thence to
Panay and Mindoro. A less ambitious network was finally made operational in 2003 by the
DOTC. Together with the Eastern seaboard links, these intermodal links were dubbed the
“Strong Republic Nautical Highway” (World Bank 2004). Unfortunately, cargo handling fees are
being collected in these PPA RORO ports even if no commensurate service is provided.
14 This figure still does not reflect the share of PPA from cargo handling in the international ports,
MICT, and South Harbor.25
Necessary Reforms
The inefficiencies in port operations and administration are due to the flaws
in the port policy and regulatory design. These flaws have led to very limited
competition and little private sector participation.
Reforming the PPA
Because of the intrinsic flaws in the structure of the regulatory framework
for the port industry, a restructuring is indispensable. The PPA’s charter
has to be amended to separate the PPA’s regulatory responsibilities from its
development and operation functions. The development of ports and operation
functions are the domain of the private sector while the formulation of broad
policies is the responsibility of the DOTC.
There is a need to provide transparent rules or guidelines for the grant
or extension of cargo handling contracts. In theory, the PPA awards cargo
handling contracts on the basis of the lowest fee charged to shippers. However,
the lack of transparency in the grant or extension of cargo handling contracts,
including possible extension without the benefit of a thorough assessment of
performance creates inefficiency problems. According to the World Bank
(2003), “there is a general lack of transparency as to how cargo handling
rates are set for the different ports, how rates are increased, what constitutes
cargo handling, and what constitutes shipping or terminal charges given
that some companies offer both cargo handling and shipping services.”15
With regard to port charges, the PPA should stop collecting a percentage
of revenues and instead lease port facilities to port operators. It should allow
competition in cargo handling operation by allowing more than one operator.
Tariff setting should be deregulated and port operators and cargo handlers
should be allowed to establish cost-recovery tariffs subject to the regulatory
guidelines protecting consumer welfare against the exercise of market power.
It can draw useful lessons from international experience in port
administration (Box 1).
The recent port reform experiences of Argentina and Mexico highlight
these lessons. Prior to the reform in the 1990s, Argentina’s port operations
were characterized as highly centralized, inefficient, and costly. The fact
that its ports were open rather than terminal based led to inefficient practices
and unnecessary costs for storage and cargo handling. These problems
15 MARINA attempted to resolve the issue on shipping services and cargo handling by developing
a new chart of accounts for the unbundling of shipping and cargo handling costs and by
requiring shipping companies to use them (World Bank 2003).
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therefore resulted in the ports’ loss of market share to the road sector and to
more efficient neighboring ports such as the Chilean ports.
The Argentinian reform process sought to achieve the objectives of
reduced cost and increased productivity. The strategy focused on privatization,
decentralization, and competition. As a result of the implementation of this
strategy, there was a sharp decline in port charges and tariffs, and an increase
in labor productivity and cargo volumes. The decentralization of port
administration, on the other hand, led to government savings from the
devolution and privatization of small ports and/or closure of unprofitable
ports. In sum, the positive externalities of the reform process produced a
positive impact on Argentina’s external trade, a considerable reduction in
freight rates, and savings to the national government (Estache et al. 2001 ).
The case of Mexico is similar to the Argentinian experience. The same
strategy was adopted—decentralization of port administration to promote
interport competition, privatization, and liberalization. The first phase of
Box 1. Port administration lessons applicable to the Philippines
• None of the successful ports and well-managed ports is administered by a “centralized”
system of port administration;
• The ports are run by independent boards (of directors) and professional managers
carefully appointed to represent and serve the interests and aspirations of the local
community and industry;
• The consistent practice of utilizing competition, whether intraport or interport rivalry, is no
accident. Competition is regarded as the primary market force in regulating the operator’s
business behavior, motivating them to produce higher levels of service quality, disciplining
them to reduce costs;
• A decentralized system of local port authorities each operating independently is predicated
on the fact that a local port authority can respond to market conditions more quickly than
a centralized authority can;
• It is no coincidence that a dynamic and responsive board makes a considerable difference
in the performance of a port. Although the constitution of a port authority in the international
scene offers a diversity of practice, there is invariably a strong commonality among them
such as a strong community and industry representation with a degree of government
participation in the board; and
• The utilization of the private sector (or privatization) in port functions has been carefully
predicated on the strategy of generating competition among the operators within the port.
Source: Yee (2000)27
the reform process focused on the decentralization of port administration,
which was achieved by creating independent port administrations, with the
national government only having supervisory functions over the system.
Similar to Argentina, the independent port administrations were made up
of representatives from the local government and the private sector. The
independent port administrations performed the functions of planning,
building infrastructures and promoting the port, and safety.
The second phase of the reform process centered on the privatization of
the port industry to private investors, both domestic and foreign. The private
sector was initially allowed to operate the terminals and facilities. Private
entities interested in bidding for concessions submitted bids to be evaluated
by the competition agency in order to avoid market power after privatization.
Likewise, port tariffs were liberalized and cross subsidies and entry barriers
eliminated. Only in cases where there is not enough competition would
regulation surface. Eventually, private sector participation expanded to port
ownership and administration (Estache et al. 2001).
Promotion of the Road-RORO system
The first best scenario is to privatize the PPA ports and to encourage the
development of a road-RORO system by the private sector. However, given
the political and vested interests supporting the PPA, the second best approach
is the development of a road-RORO terminal system (RRTS) that parallels
or complements the existing PPA port system. The RRTS will introduce the
needed ports competition to improve efficiency and reduce cost, and give
shippers the flexibility to determine the most efficient and cost-effective way
of shipping their cargoes. In addition, the government should allow the
conversion of private noncommercial ports into commercial ports under the
RRTS. This will instantly expand the existing port network with no or
minimal cost.
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Structure of the Philippine Shipping Industry
The shipping industry plays a crucial role in the development of the country.
It enables the movement of goods and passengers in the Philippine archipelago
and to other countries. Efficient shipping services encourage economic growth
and development and are vital for regional integration (Table 9).
4 State of Competition and Regulation of Inter-
island Shipping










Liner shipping is involved in the transport of both passengers and
cargoes although some liners carry only cargoes, e.g., Solid Ship-
ping. It follows fixed sailing schedules, regular ports of call (routes),
and frequency of travel. Liner routes are classified as primary
(major ports with developed markets), secondary, tertiary, and de-
velopmental (also referred to as “missionary”).  Companies in the
liner shipping business are WG&A (now ATS), Negros Navigation,
Solid Lines, Lorenzo, and Sulpicio. These corporations already
take 90% of the market (Austria 2002).
These are freight vessels that do not follow a regular route and
schedule. They are contracted (chartered) by shippers to deliver
cargoes from port to port. They only handle cargoes.
These are specialized vessels that transport oil, chemicals, and
LPG.
These vessels travel short distances. They cater mainly to passen-
gers.  The service has a fixed schedule and a regular route.
Vessels used for short distance travel. Can accommodate passen-
gers and vehicles (as cargo). The service has a fixed schedule and
a regular route. No cargo handling involved since the cargoes are
“moving” (self-propelled) cargoes.
Vessels owned and used by companies to transport their cargoes
(in many cases using their own ports).
Used in ship-to-shore loading and unloading of cargoes.29
Figure 3.The Philippine shipping industry
The shipping industry is divided into three main sectors: (a) the shipping
sector, (b) the shipbuilding, ship repair, and drydocking sector, and (c) the
manning/seafaring sector (Figure 3). The shipping sector is further divided
into domestic inter-island shipping and ocean-going (international) shipping.
Domestic inter-island shipping consists of liner shipping operations, tramping,
tanker services, ferry/fast craft operations, RORO shipping, and barging
operations. This section of the paper discusses inter-island shipping.
Liner shipping industry performance
Number of passengers and cargo volume
The sheer number of passengers and volume of cargoes that utilize this
mode of transportation manifests the importance of the shipping industry in
the economy. Sea transport is the dominant mode for passenger travel and
cargo. In 2001, around 75 percent of travelers used the sea transport mode
(Table 10).
From 1991 to 2001, passenger traffic via sea grew by 175.93 percent.
This translates to an annual growth rate of 5.81 percent. In terms of the
share of cargo traffic, almost all (99.7%) cargoes are shipped via sea transport
(Table 11). Cargo traffic grew by 149.32 percent in the period 1991–2001, or
an average annual growth of 4.09 percent.
Table 12 provides a disaggregation of cargo movements by major port
of origin.
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Maritime safety
The performance of Philippine shipping in terms of safety is lamentable.
From 1995 to 2002, the Philippines has averaged 162 maritime accidents
and 215 fatalities per annum. A study16 of maritime accidents from 1991 to
2000 revealed the four most frequent causes of maritime accidents: (a)
capsizing (30%); (b) sinking (25%); (c) grounding (21%); and (d) engine trouble
(12%). Motorized bancas were found to be the most vulnerable to capsizing,
grounding, and sinking. Capsizing happened mostly during typhoon seasons.
The casualty figures were also very high—averaging 118 fatalities and 152
missing persons per annum.


































Source: Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC), “The study on the master plan
for the strategic development of the national port system in the Republic of the Philippines,”
(December 2003).


































Source: DOTC Master Plan (2003)
16 Sigua, R. and G. Aguilar. Maritime incident analysis using GIS. 5th EASTS Conference, October
2003.31














































































































































































































Source: DOTC Master Plan (2003)
*Data on cargo volume of Polloc and Jolo were 1998 figures and thus, were not included in the total.
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Service quality and cost
The export of manufactured goods by ocean transport is at a disadvantage
because Main Line Container Operators do not make direct calls to Manila,
but rather use common carrier feeders to transport cargo to and from their
regional hubs such as Hong Kong and Singapore.  Table 13 shows the feeder
shipping services serving Philippine international ports.
Exports also face the problem of inefficient inter-island container
handling facilities and shipping services. The export of perishables is
hampered by the lack of a cold chain in moving goods from the farmer/
producer to the point of export. The export of bulk cargoes is at a competitive
disadvantage because there are few port facilities that provide efficient bulk
cargo handling and storage. Thus, freight rates tend to be higher and this
increases shipping and transaction costs (Table 14).
The domestic shipping fleet operates smaller cargo vessels compared
with the feeder vessels used for regional trans-shipment. Philippine container
vessels average about 20 years old and are only about 2000 GRT or less than
250 TEU in capacity. The general cargo vessels, many of which carry
containers, are younger but average less than 500 GRT. The small size of
Philippine cargo vessels means limited capacity and more turnaround times
in domestic ports, which themselves are inefficient. Thus, inter-island
shipping costs are extremely high.





























Source: Direct Container Line Phils.
Note: The main feeder service route going to the USA is via Kaoshiung. For Europe and Middle East trade,
the Philippines uses Singapore as transhipment port.  The majority of the feeders operate a weekly service,
either offering short-haul feeder vessels or multiple vessels calling on several ports in rotation.33
On the other hand, the quality of passenger service has recently shown
dramatic improvements in the primary and secondary routes. New facilities
and amenities were introduced on board while passenger accommodation
and ticketing and booking facilities were upgraded. Fastcraft ferries became
popular on the secondary routes in the Visayan seas, due to its shorter
travel time, but these soon declined due to oversupply and the high cost of
operations. Not unlike the cargo service, the quality in the tertiary route is
still considered poor—with about 78 percent of the routes still served by a
single (and small) operator  (World Bank 2004).
Institutional and Regulatory Framework for the Shipping
Industry
The government agency for shipping is the Maritime Industry Authority
(MARINA), which has both developmental and regulatory functions. It is
under the supervision of the DOTC. Unlike the PPA, it has not faced conflict-
of-interest situation because it is not involved in ship-operating activities. It
regulates all carriers and shipping companies, including those in logistics.
DOTC, meanwhile, is responsible for the provision of navigation and maritime
communication facilities. The Philippine Coast Guard is responsible for
security and safety enforcement along coastal areas. Table 15 shows the key
stakeholders of the domestic shipping industry as well as the major
associations and organizations representing these stakeholders.
MARINA exercises its regulatory functions through the issuance of a
Certificate of Public Conveyance defining route and safety regulation and
fixing rates of passenger fares and cargo freight. At present, there are 694
cargo routes being served by the domestic inter-island shipping industry. To
operate on any given route, a shipping company has to secure a permit from
Table 14. Comparative freight rates*
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Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR)
Commission on Higher Education
(CHED), Maritime Training
Council (MTC), TESDA, other














brokers, and 4th party logistic
providers
Consumers/passengers
Government agency tasked to oversee the development and pro-
motion of the shipping industry. Vested with economic regulatory
powers. Acts as the “flag state administrator” of the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) in the Philippines. Handles the certifi-
cation of Filipino seafarers.
Together with PPA and MARINA, tasked to implement safety ship-
ping-related marine pollution rules and standards, maintains and
operates aids to navigation, and enforces maritime laws and regula-
tions.  Implements IMO’s MARPOL 73–78 but enforcement is
weak due to lack of resources.
Regulates all kinds of environmental pollution, including marine
(e.g., oil spillage, garbage dumping).
CHED regulates all specialized schools, including those that offer
maritime education and training of various types of seamen.
Regulates all forms of telecommunication, including grant of radio
frequencies for vessels whether ship-to-ship, ship-to- shore,  or
ship-to-INMARSAT & GMDSS.
Licensure (marine engineering / marine transport)
Applies ship inspection rules for vessels 500GRT and above, in
accordance with International Association of Classification Societ-
ies (IACS). Seven classification societies exist in the Philippines.
Domestic and foreign shipping companies calling at Philippine ports.
Main organization: PISA; member organizations of PISA: liners-
DSA; trampers-UTAP; ferry operators-VAFCSO; tankers-Philip-
pine Tanker Operators; ocean-going-FSA.
Offers pilot services at major ports. Association: United Harbor Pilot
Association of the Philippines.
Private cargo owners; port users (exporters/importers, domestic
manufacturers, traders,).  Organizations: DMAP, PHILEXPORT,
Federation of Mindanao Shippers, PCCI, and FPI.
Ship officers and crew.  Organization: Association of Maritime Offic-
ers and Seafarers Union of the Philippines (AMOSUP).
Provides cargo consolidation and freight forwarding services.
Inland trucking service providers.  Organization: CTAP
Provide services to shippers, by addressing all requirements at
every stage of the logistics chain, including tracking, documentation
and customs clearance.
The general public whose interest the MARINA is supposed to
protect.  Organizations: Consumer Watch, Consumer Complaints
Center, etc.35
MARINA. For a long time, MARINA has subscribed to the ‘prior operator’
rule that has raised the hurdle on the entry of a second operator to a given
route. It required proof of presence of sufficient traffic to warrant the operation
of another carrier without resulting in “destructive competition”.
In 1994, reforms liberalized the entry into routes.17 Presumption of
need is deemed in favor of the prospective entrant while the existing operator
has the burden of proof that a proposed service is not needed. Routes were
opened to at least two shipping operators. To encourage entry in
developmental or new routes, the pioneering operator was given protection
for a period of five years. This was reiterated under Memorandum Circular
106 (1995) that opened all monopoly routes with five-year history to a second
operator, and allowed rates different from the fork rates to be imposed by
vessels with new technological features.
With the exception of third-class passenger fares and specific
noncontainerized basic commodities whose rates are set by MARINA, all
other passenger fares and cargo rates have been deregulated. Cargo rates
are set through negotiation between the shipping company and the cargo
owner. Theoretically, shipping companies are not supposed to exceed 12
percent rate of return on operating assets under the Public Service Act.18
RA 9295 (An Act Promoting the Development of Philippine Domestic
Shipping, Shipbuilding, and Ship Repair/Breaking, Ordaining Reforms in
Government Policies Toward Shipping in the Philippines, and for Other
Purposes) further deregulated the shipping industry by allowing shipping
companies to fix their own rates. The following were included in the
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) to protect public interest:
• development of routes to promote competition;
• MARINA intervention in rate setting under certain conditions; and
• right of shippers to question/challenge the rate increase.
MARINA issued Memorandum Circular 15319 removing the Consultative
Council (DOSCON), which provided the venue for discussing proposed rate
increases. The only requirement now is the publication of proposed rate
increases in newspapers of general circulation. As a result, freight rates
have increased annually over the last three years as shown in Table 16.
17 See Annex A for a brief history of regulation of shipping services.
18 Commonwealth Act No. 146 of 1936 classified shipping services as public service thus,
subject to regulation.
19 It revised the IRR of EO 213.
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The five-year period for protecting pioneer operators in developmental
routes was revised to include certain conditions. New entrants can ply these
routes as long as the entry was not detrimental to existing operators. Entry
was not allowed when existing operators only have break-even load and
when their financial statements manifest that they are losing from the
operation.
The newly enacted Domestic Shipping Development Act (RA 9295)
provided the industry with tax and other incentives to encourage the
modernization of the industry. It requires the “retirement of old vessels,
including wooden-hulled ships.” The law also has provisions on ship safety
standards, move toward ship classification, and compulsory insurance
coverage of passengers and cargoes.
The investment incentives provided are the following:
• value added tax exemption on the importation of vessels, spare parts,
materials for the construction and repair of ships, life-saving, safety,
fire-fighting, cargo handling, communication, navigation equipment,
etc.;
• restrictions on vessel importation to promote local ship building;
• net loss carry over; and
• accelerated depreciation.
The law also defined MARINA’s mandate, which was simply a
reiteration of it existing regulatory and quasijudicial functions and created
the MARINA Trust Fund. The Trust Fund was meant to augment the
budgetary allocation that MARINA receives from Congress. A MARINA Trust
Fund Management Committee will be organized to manage the Fund. Aside
from representatives from the MARINA, two private sector representatives















General Rate Increases + Automatic
Fuel Rate Adjustments (AFRA) Year
Source: DMAP37
will be included in the Committee, coming from the shipping industry and
shipper association. It is hoped that the trust fund will be utilized to achieve
the objective of developing the shipping industry.
Emerging Issues
The deregulation that began in 1992 led to the growth in the number of
shipping companies from 223 in 1975 to 585 in 2001. However, the domestic
shipping industry has remained very concentrated, with five shipping
companies accounting for 90 percent of passenger and cargo markets and
almost all of the primary and secondary shipping routes.  Austria (2002)
commented that “10 years after the demonopolization of shipping routes, 50
percent and 70 percent of primary and secondary/tertiary routes, respectively,
remain a monopoly.”20 Table 17 and Table 18 show the state of competition
in cargo service and in passenger travel, respectively.  There is a need for
Table 17. State of competition in cargo service, 1998
Route Classification
Source: Austria (2002)
Routes with only one operator
Routes with at least two operators
 - Routes with effectively one operator
 - Routes with substantial competition
 - Routes with mild competition
Total number of routes
Primary
   No. %
Secondary
   No. %
Tertiary


































Table 18. State of competition in passenger travel, 1998
Route Classification
Source: Austria (2002)
Routes with only one operator
Routes with at least two operators
 - Routes with effectively one operator
 - Routes with substantial competition
 - Routes with mild competition
Total number of routes
Primary
   No. %
Secondary
   No. %
Tertiary


































20 DMAP claims that the liners operate in a cartel-like fashion.
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transparency in the awarding of routes to ensure competition.
The deregulation of passenger fares and cargo freight rate, except for
third-class passenger fares and specific noncontainerized basic cargo, has
introduced flexibility in fare setting. Shipping companies and cargo owners
negotiate, with the Public Service Act capping the rates of return of shipping
companies at 12 percent. There is thus a need for MARINA to establish
transparent accounting and reporting standards to ensure that the agreed
upon fare rate complies with the Public Service Act.
Maritime accidents exact a heavy toll on lives and property. Old vessels
that are not seaworthy have to be replaced. There is therefore a need for
MARINA to establish and enforce strictly rules on vehicle safety and
procedures for vessel inspection in order to reduce the high rate of maritime
accidents.39
Port Sector
Various inefficiencies saddle the port sector and these have resulted in the
high cost of shipping which, in turn, negatively impacts on the country’s
competitiveness and growth. There is an absence of effective intraport and
interport competition among the country’s ports. Port administration is highly
centralized with the PPA as the central authority. Independent port
authorities theoretically provide some (very limited) competition to the PPA’s
stranglehold of ports and there is some semblance of support to competition
through the concessions awarded to selected private sector participants, but
the port sector remains dominated by the PPA that has been tasked by
PD 857 to regulate, develop, and own ports in the country. The PPA’s charter
has given rise to conflict-of-interest situations for the PPA and has only
allowed token private sector participation. The PPA regulates and approves
tariffs, a share of which is given to it as mandated by law. It has used its
regulatory power to bar direct competition between Harbour Centre (a private
commercial port) and the PPA-owned ports in Manila, MICT and South
Harbor.
To government’s credit are past efforts to modernize and privatize public
ports. In 1987, PPA awarded the terminal operation of MICT to ICTSI under
the “landlord” port model. A decade later, the government used this approach
in awarding a concession to another private company to operate South Harbor.
Efforts to privatize the Manila North Harbor have failed.   EO 212 tried to
accelerate the demonopolization and privatization program for government
ports in 1994. However, vigorous opposition by port workers made the
government to revoke EO 212.
The provision of cargo handling services in a port is not competitive.
The six cargo handlers at North Harbor are allowed to operate only in specific
piers dedicated to specific shipping lines. Cargo handling rates increased
annually during the period 1998–2002. In 2001, the PPA issued the new
guidelines for the renewal of expired and expiring cargo handling contracts
(PPA AO 01-2001). These guidelines grant a two-year probationary contract
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that can be converted into a long-term contract (8–10 years) without the
benefit of public bidding. However, current government policy under EO 40
and EO 109 and RA 9184 mandate as a matter of national policy transparency
and competition through public bidding in government procurement.
A positive development seems to be the establishment of the RRTS
under EO 170 and EO 170-A. These EOs also promote private sector
investment and participation in the RRTS. Designed to be a parallel system
to the PPA port system, the RRTS forms an integral part of the national
highway system.
In view of the foregoing, the following are recommended:
• amend the charter of the PPA to remove conflict-of-interest
provisions and to separate the regulatory function from the
development function;
• require the PPA to have transparent and competitive bidding
procedures on granting or extending cargo handling contracts;
• revoke the PPA’s Administrative Order 01-2001;
• require transparent accounting and reporting standards for the
enforcement of port charges and shipping rates;
• replace the present practice of the PPA sharing in port fees and
other charges with a (regulatory) fee for services rendered;
• promote the development of RRTS as a parallel system to PPA
ports and remove the cargo handling fees on RORO cargo when no
corresponding service is offered; and
• continue the privatization of operations in PPA ports and terminals
and the designation of private noncommercial ports into private
commercial ports.
Shipping Sector
In 1994, the government issued executive orders that aimed to deregulate
the shipping industry. EO 185 demonopolized shipping routes while EO 213
deregulated passenger fares and freight rates. Republic Act 9295 further
deregulated the shipping industry by allowing shipping companies to fix the
rates subject only to a negotiation between themselves and cargo owners
and a publication of the proposed increase in rates in newspapers of general
circulation.
However, despite the deregulation and liberalization that took place
since the nineties, which resulted in the growth in the number of shipping
companies, the domestic shipping industry has remained dominated by five
shipping companies. These five account for 90 percent of total passenger and
cargoes and almost all of the primary and secondary shipping routes. There41
is a need for MARINA, the regulator, to carefully review its policies and
regulations and the conduct and performance of the industry to uphold
competition and the protection of consumers from the exercise of market
power. MARINA has to have clear and transparent procedures for route
licensing.
There is also a need to enforce transparent accounting and reporting
standards for the monitoring of the rate-setting exercise conducted by shipping
companies and cargo owners. DMAP, for instance, claims that shipping
liners operate in a cartel-like fashion.
There is also a need to improve the enforcement of maritime safety
rules and regulations to reduce the severity and frequency of maritime
accidents. The high maritime accidents and fatalities have negative impact
on growth and particularly on the poor that rely on sea transport for mobility
and cargo transport.
In view of the foregoing, the following are recommended:
• require MARINA to review its policies and regulations to uphold
competition and the protection of consumers from the exercise of
market power;
• require MARINA to have clear and transparent procedures for route
licensing; and
• strictly enforce maritime safety regulations and inspection of vessels
to check seaworthiness and provide effective training programs on
maritime safety.
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The Beginnings of Regulation  (1920–1970)
In 1936, Commonwealth Act No. 146 (also known as the Public Service Act)
was enacted into law. In this Act, shipping services were considered public
service and therefore should be regulated. Fixed rates for passenger fares
and cargo freight were instituted as well as a cap of 12 percent on return on
investments of shipping companies.
Cargoes were classified into three types of commodities: Class A
(processed products), B (semiprocessed products), and C (unprocessed or
agricultural commodities). Passengers, on the other hand, are categorized
as first, second, and third class. Each class offers a different type of service
and accommodation.
In 1972, the issuance of Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) was
instituted. The CPC authorizes shipping companies to operate and offer
shipping services for commercial purposes. The objective of the CPC is to
curb the excessive use of major routes and to shift the operation of some
ships to less utilized routes. CPCs are issued on a per vessel, per trip, and
per schedule basis. This was established to serve as an entry barrier. To get
hold of the certificate, a first-come-first-serve policy was instituted. For
developmental routes, the new entrant that has been issued a certificate is
protected from competition (until such time that the investment of the operator
has already been recovered). However, the period for recovering investments
for the developmental route operator was not stated. As such, almost all
routes were monopolized.
Changes in Rates and Low Compliance Levels (1980s)
The classification of passengers and commodities in the early 1920s for fixed
rates underwent changes. In 1983, distance was factored in. The rates varied
as distance increased. Distances were classified using the following ranges:
0–100 miles, 101–300 miles, and over 300 miles. Moreover, rates had also
taken into account the cargo classification. Class A commodities were charged
higher rates than B and C.
Annex A: A Brief History of the Regulation of
Shipping Services43
Memorandum Circular No. 26 was introduced requiring all operators
to stick to their routes, sailing frequency, and schedules. Sanctions were
given to violators. Rerouting of vessels required an amendment of the CPC.
Acquisition of new vessels was also regulated.
Deregulation Era (1990–present)
In 1994, President Ramos issued a series of EOs aimed at deregulating the
shipping industry:
• EO 185 – demonopolization of shipping routes
• EO 213 – deregulation of passenger fares and freight rates
AnnexCompetition Policy and Regulation in Ports and Shipping
44
Austria, M. 2002.  Philippine domestic and shipping industry: state of
competition and market structure. PASCN Discussion Paper Series No.
2002-04. Makati City, Philippines: Philippine APEC Study Center Network.
Banks, G. 2002. Competition regulation of infrastructure: getting the balance
right. Paper presented at the IIR Conference, National Competition Policy,
Seven Years On. Melbourne, Australia, 14 March.
Basilio, E.  1999. EO 59: Still a lot of room for improvement. UA&P Staff Memos.
Pasig City, Philippines: University of Asia and the Pacific.
———. 2004. Competition at the Manila ports. UA&P Industry Monitor. Pasig
City, Philippines: University of Asia and the Pacific.
Basilio, E. and J.C. Llarena. 2003. The strong republic nautical highway: rolling
on to progress (a primer on  EO 170). UA&P Industry Monitor. Pasig City,
Philippines: University of Asia and the Pacific.
Clark, X., J. Dollar and A. Micco. 2004. Port efficiency, maritime transport costs
and bilateral trade. NBER Discussion Paper 10353. Cambridge, MA:
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Estache, A., M. Gonzalez and L. Trujillo. 2001. Technical efficiency gains from
port reform : the potential for yardstick competition in Mexico. Washington,
DC: World Bank.
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). 2003. Domestic shipping
development plan in the Philippines. Makati City, Philippines: JICA.
Limao, N. and A.J. Venables. 2001. Infrastructure, geographical disadvantage,
and transport costs. World Bank Economic Review 15(3):451-479.
References45
Newbery, D. 1999. Privatization, restructuring, and regulation of network
utilities. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Peters, H.J. 1995. Private sector involvement in East and Southeast Asian ports.
An overview of contractual arrangements. Infrastructure Notes – The World
Bank. Transport No. PS-10.
Romero, R. 2004. Strategic implications of competition. Masteral thesis. Pasig
City, Philippines: University of Asia and the Pacific.
Sigua, R. and G. Aguilar. 2003. Maritime incident analysis using GIS. Paper
presented during the 5th EASTS, Fukuoka, Japan, October 2003.
Tornell, A. 1999. Privatizing the privatized.  NBER Discussion Paper 7206.
Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
(UNESCAP). 2002a. Comparative analysis of port tariffs in the ESCAP
region. New York: UNESCAP.
———. 2002b. Report of the regional seminar  on liberalization of maritime
transport services under WTO GATS. New York: UNESCAP.
www.unescap.org/ttdw/Publications/TFS_pubs/pub_2217.pdf.
World Bank. 2003. Reforms in ports and shipping. Ports and shipping policy
briefs. Discussion draft. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTPHILIPPINES/Resources/DB12-Portsandshippingpolicybrief-
June29.pdf.
———. 2004. Meeting infrastructure needs. Philippine transport sector review.
Manila. Unpublished.
———. 2007. Port reform toolkit. 2nd edition. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Yee, P. 2000.  Port administration lessons applicable for the Philippines.
Unpublished.
References